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Abstract ---'­
In this paper 1 study the business cyc1e implications of alternative 
insurance technologies using a computable general equilibrium heterogeneous 
e agent environment. 1 find that the limited monetary arrangement entaiIs 
larger fluctuations in hours relative to productivity than those that obtain in an 
identical economy where every risk is costlessly insurable. 1 also find that in 
the monetary economy the price level displays a markedly countercyc1ical 
behavior. Finally 1 evaluate the welafare costs of the monetary self-insurancee 
arrangement.
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Introduction 
Most computable general equilibrium studies of business cycle 
fluctuations assume representative agents. Consequent1y, insurance against 
e idiosyncratic income risks is not an issue in those economies. When labor 
indivisibilities result in ex-post agent heterogeneity, business cycle theorists 
typically assume full sets of contingent claims that imply that idiosyncratic 
( income risks are perfectly insurable. We know that in modern industrial 
economies mechanisms to insure against income risks are limited. We also 
know that people hold liquid assets to hedge themselves against idiosyncratic 
c: 
income variability. Yet until recent1y, computational difficulties have severely 
limited theoretical studies of economies that inc1ude this monetary insurance 
feature and, as a result, we know very little about the business cycle behavior 
of this c1ass of economies. 
e 1 have argued elsewhere in favor of the consumption smoothing 
approach to holding liquid assets (see Dír:z-Giménez and Prescott [1989]). In 
that paper we develop the computati"üal techniques that are needed to analyze 
e general equilibrium structures that inc1ude a monetary insurance feature. 
Here, 1 use these techniques to explore the business cycle and welfare 
implications of alternative insurance technologies. 
To this purpose, 1 study the cyclical behavior of the c1ass of 
e heterogeneous agent monetary economies described in Díaz-Giménez and 
Prescott [1989]. As a suitable term of comparison, 1 study the business cyc1e 
fluctuations of another class of economies where income risks are perfectly 
e insurable. In all other respects the two c1asses of economies are identical. 1 
ask whether the nature of the insurance technology assumed makes 
important differences in our understanding of business cycles. In particular, 
1 study the implications of the limited monetary insurance arrangement for 
the yet unsettled question of the aggregate intertemporal substitutability of 
leisure. 1 also evaluate the welfare costs associated with the monetary 
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insurance technology in terms of the additional output needed to make agents 
indifferent between both c1asses of economies. 
To answer these questions 1 depart from the representative agent 
e 
abstraction. In both c1asses of model economies agents' marginal 
productivities vary randomly over time and part of this variation is 
idiosyncratic. When agents work, they are paid their marginal producto 
e Consequently agents labor income streams are variable. They also differ 
across agents. In the monetary economies 1 assume that private contracts 
conditional on the realizations of the individual-specific shocks are not 
enforceable. There is a small denomination currency-like asset issued by the 
e 
government. In this paper, 1 am not concerned with the historical reasons for 
this arrangement. 1 simply take it for granted. Given their preferences for 
smooth streams of consumption and the lack of other forms of insurance, 
e agents hold this asset to hedge themselves against their idiosyncratic income 
risks and they vary their asset holdings to smooth their lifetime streams of 
consumption. In this sense the mOt..c~i economy is monetary and it is part of 
e: the permanent income and of the consumption smoothing traditions. 
To implement the monetary insurance arrangement the government 
announces explicit labor income tax rate and inflation rate policies. Each 
period the government exchanges currency and goods at the price implied by 
( 
the inflation rate policy and it c1ears the market. When aggregate private 
purchases of goods at the policy implied pricesare positive, the government 
sells part of the goods previously obtained from taxation. In equilibrium, of 
e course, government consumption, which equals government tax receipts 
minus government sales of goods, is constrained to being non-negative. 
Following Rogerson [1988] and Hansen [1985], 1 assume that the 
provision of labor services is indivisible. Agents can choose to either work 
e forty-five hour weeks or not at all. Unlike Rogerson and Hansen, however, 1 do 
not assume a technology that allows the planner to determine randomly who is 
to be employed. Given that 1 discretize the state space and that 1 use 
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numerical methods to compute the equilibrium processes, the non-convexity 
resulting from the indivisibility does not present any technical problems. Each 
period the agents decide whether or not to work in the market. Their decision 
depends on their current asset holdings and on the current market value of 
their time which, in turn, depends upon the realization of their partly 
idiosyncratic productivity shocks. 
At each point in time, therefore, agents are heterogeneous with respect 
to the market value of their time and, in the monetary economies, with respect 
to their asset positions. Ex-post, they also differ in their consumption and 
employment status. These cross-sectional differences result endogenously 
from the agents' optimal responses to the different histories of their individual 
shocks which condition their saving and employment decisions. 
Including capital in this class of economies makes the computation 
costs unmanageable. I therefore abstract from capital accumulation in this 
study. Consequently, agents can only smooth consumption by varying their 
holdings of liquid assets. The inflation tax levied on these assets increases the 
cost of future consumption in terms of current consumption. The desire to 
accumulate liquid assets is one of the reasons that accounts for large 
fluctuations in aggregate hours in response to smaH transitory changes in 
average labor compensation and drives sorne of the other business cycle 
properties of these models. 
Since there is no capital accumulation in this class of economies it is 
difficult to compare my results with those of previous computable general 
equilibrium studies of the business cycle. To provide a more suitable term of 
comparison, I analyze the business cycle behavior of a perfect insurance 
economy that also abstracts from capital accumulation. In the perfect 
insurance economy there are no limitations on the set of contingent claims 
available to agents and aH income risks are costlessly insurable. In aH other 
respects both economies are identical. In particular they are both subject to 
the same histories of shocks and they have the same labor income tax rates 
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and sequences of governrnent expenditures. In the perfect insurance economy 
lump-sum taxes generate the seignorage revenues of the monetary economy 
and enable the government to satisfy its budget. In Sections 1 and 2 1 describe 
the monetary and the perfect insurance economies. To determine the values of 
the model parameters 1 calibrate both structures to U.S. time series and micro 
data. In Section 3 1 discuss my calibration choices. 1 then simulate the model 
economies and in Section 4 1 report the cyclical behavior. 
The monetary insurance arrangement, however, implies that the 
intratemporal allocations of consumption and leisure across the different 
agent types are suboptimal. For policy purposes it would be interesting to 
obtain an estimate of the welfare costs arising from the existence of 
uninsurable risks. To evaluate these costs, in Section 5 1 calculate the average 
level of lump-sum taxes that makes agents indifferent between the monetary 
economy and perfect insurance economy. Section 6 conc1udes the papero 
(1 Section 1. The Imperfect Insurance Monetary Economies 
Agents 
There is a continuum of agents with total measure one. The agents 
order their random streams of consumption and leisure according to: 
00 
(1) 
e 
where ct ~ ois a perishable consumption good and u is concave and increasing 
in both arguments. Parameter T is the total endowment of productive time and 
nt is the amount of time al10cated to market activities. Consequent1y, T-nt is 
time al10cated to household production. Here it is simply cal1ed leisure. 
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Agents are heterogeneous with respect to their asset holdings and with 
respect to the realizations of the individual-specific productivity shock. At each 
point in time the measure of agents of type (a,s) is Xt(a,s). The initial measure 
of agent types is Xo. 
e 
Informalion 
There is an exogenous economy-wide stochastic process {Zt}. 
process is a Markov chain with transition probabilities, 
This 
e 
1T(Z,Z') = Pr{zt+l= z' IZt = z} 
for z, z' E Z = {1,2, ... ,nz} 
el 
There are identically distributed individual specific stochastic processes 
{St}. Conditional on {zJ, the {sJ processes are independent across individuals 
and fol1ow a finite state Markov chain. The conditional transition probabilities 
are: 
1T(S,S' Iz') = Pr{St+l = s' ISt = s, zt+l = z'} 
for s, s' E S = {1,2, ...ns } and z' E Z 
The joint processes on (s,z) are therefore Markov chains with n = nsnz states. 
Their transition probabilities are: 
1T [( s' ,z') I (s,z)] = Pr{Zt+l = z' 1 Zt = z}Pr{st+l =s' 1 St = s, Zt+l = z'} 
Agents know the laws of motion of both {sJ and {Zt}. At the beginning of each 
period they observe the realizations of both stochastic processes. Trade ensues. 
e 
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Technologies 
If St = s and Zt = z, the agent's date t production possibility set is determined 
by: 
e 
where Yt is the agent's pre-tax output of the date t consumption good, and 
e w(s,z) is a technology parameter. When agentes choose to work, they are paid 
their marginal producto Parameter w(s,z) therefore equals the individual real 
wage. 
Following Rogerson [1988] and Hansen [1985], 1 assume a labor 
o 
indivisibility. Hours of labor services provided, n t , are constrained to belong to 
the set {O, 1}. Zero corresponds to not being employed and one corresponds to 
being employed. Unlike them, however, 1 do not assume a technology that 
allows the planner to determine randomly who is to be employed. Agents 
either choose to work or they choose not too When they choose to work, they can 
dedicate part of their earnings to insure themselves against future income 
variability by accumulating liquid assets. When they choose not to work, they 
use their previously accumulated savings to finance their consumption. 
Monetary Arrangements 
e Individual real wages vary randomly over time. As we have just seen, 
part of this variation is idiosyncratic. The real wage variations interacting 
with the agents' employment decisions give rise to income variations. Private 
contracts conditional on the tealizations of the individual-specific productivity 
shocks are not enforceable in this class of economies. Agents therefore have 
no access to private technologies to hedge themselves against income risks. 
Their preferences for smooth streams consumption induce them to hold liquid 
() 
assets. In this environment there is only one such asset. It is issued by the 
government in small denominations and, since it is constrained to being non­
negative, 1 call it currency. Each period the government exchanges goods for 
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currency at	 the policy determined price Pt and it clears the market. When 
aggregate private purchases of goods turn out to be positive at this policy 
implied price, the government sells part of the goods previously obtained from 
e 
taxation. The market clearing price is chosen to satisfy Pt = Pt-l e(Zt), where 
e(Zt) is the inflation rateo The inflation rate policy, e(Zt), and the labor income 
tax rate policy, 8(Zt), are restricted to being a function of the exogenous 
o	 component of the economy-wide state only. This restriction was dictated by 
computational considerations. 1 
Agents can therefore hold integer amounts of small denomination 
currency
o 
a E A = {O,l,2, ... ,n }a
Statese 
The state of an individual is the pair (a,s). Variable a is its endogenous 
component and it denotes the real value of an individual's beginning of period 
assets in terms of the previous date price level. Computational considerations 
e led me to this particular choice of units. Variable s is the exogenous 
component of the individual state and it denotes the individual-specific 
productivity shock. The measure of agents of type (a,s) is x(a,s). We let x 
denote the corresponding measure. The economy-wide state is the pair (x,z). 
The measure of agent types, x, is its endogenous component and the economy­
wide productivity shock, z, is its exogenous component. 
Controls 
Each household chooses consumption c(abSt,Zt), employment n(abst,zt), 
and real currency balances a'(at,Sbzt). Government policy determines the 
labor income tax rate, 8(zt), and the inflation rate, e(zt). The government 
either buys goods or sells part of the goods obtained from taxation and clears 
the market at the policy implied prices. The quantity of goods consumed by the 
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government is g(Xt,Zt). It is equal to tax revenues plus government purchases 
of goods and, in equilibrium, it is constrained to being non-negative. 
Government consumption does not increase the utility of private agents. 
C\ j 
Indiuiduals' Optimization Problem 
The individuals' dynamic program is 
v(a,s,z) = m~ {u(c,T-n) + B~ v(a',s',z') rr 
c,a ,n s, z' 
[(s',z') I(s,z)]} 
o subject to the budget constraint 
e + a' ~ e~z) + nw(s,z)[l-8(z)] 
and to 
e ~ 0, a' E {O,l,... ,na } and n E {O,l} 
Definition ofEquilihrium 
An equilibrium for this class of economies is a government policy 
[e(z), 8(z)], a household policy [c(a,s,z), a'(a,s,z), n(a,s,z)] and a law of motion 
for the measure of agent types x' = fa,s' (x,z,z') such that: 
L Given the process on prices, the household policy solves the individual 
optimization program described above. 
iL The implied g sequence is non-negative: 
o 
L xas [n(a,s,z)w(s,z) - c(a,s,z)] =g(x,z) 
a,s 
for all (x,z) 
~ ° 
() 
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iiL Individual and aggregate behavior are mutually consistent 
fa,s' (x,z,z') = L x(a,s)rr(s' Is,z') 
a,sE<jl(a',zjo 
where Q>(a',z) = {(a,s): a' = a'(a,s,z)} 
o 
Given that the agent's problem is a finite state, discounted dynamic 
program, an optimal stationary Markov plan always exists. 
() Compulation 
The following computational procedure determines whether an 
equilibrium exists. The first step of is to obtain the households' optimal policy 
rules given the government policy and the informational components of the (: 
individual and economy-wide states. The second step is to use the households' 
optimal policy rules and the transitions 00 the stochastic processes to obtain 
f(x,z,z'). The third step is to determine g(x,z) residually from the market 
e clearing condition. If g(x,z) turns out to be non-negative for every possible 
realization of the joint stochastic processes, an equilibrium exists for the given 
policy [e(z), 8(z)]. Ir this is not the case, no equilibrium exists for that policy. 
Until recent1y, computational difficulties have severely limited the studyo 
of this class of monetary economies. The linear-quadratic approach that has 
proved to be so useful in other quantitative theoretical studies cannot be used 
here. This approach involves approximating the economies about their steady 
states once the random variables are set equal to their unconditional means. 
If agents were to receive their average income each period, the consumption 
smoothing role of liquid assets disappears. The linear-quadratic approach 
would therefore involve approximating the economies around zero asset() 
holdings. This would afford a rather poor approximation. To bypass this 
problem, 1 follow Imrohoroglu [1988] and [1989]. 1 discretize the state space 
e 
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and 1 use numerical methods and the supercomputer to calculate the 
equilibrium processes for the model economies. Given the relatively large size 
of the state space, the numerical algorithm combines value and policy 
iterations to keep the computation costs within reasonable limits. Ful1y 
documented version of the FORTRAN programs used to compute the 
equilibrium processes and to simulate the behavior of the economies are 
available upon request from the author. 
o 
Section 2. The Perfect lnsurance Economies 
e 
(\ 
The perfect insurance economies differ from the monetary economies in 
that private contracts conditional on the realization of the individual-specific 
shocks can be enforced. Consequent1y, agents can completely insure 
themselves against al1 risks. This feature leaves no role for a currency-like 
asset. In every other respect both classes of economies are identical. 
Specifical1y they have the same labor income tax policies, the same sequences 
of government consumption and the same histories of shocks. In the perfect 
insurance economies, lump-sum taxes generate the seignorage revenues of 
the monetary economies and enable the geovernment to satisfy its budget. 
e 
o 
Agents 
There is a continuum of agents with total measure one. As they did in 
.. ' 
the monetary economies, agents order their random streams of consumption 
and leisure according to (1). Agents are heterogeneous with respect to the 
realizations of the individual-specific shock, s. At each point in time the 
measure of agents of type s is xt(s) and the initial measure of agent types is io. 
To make both classes of economies comparable 1 require that, for each s, 
e 
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Xo(s) = L xo(a,s) 
aEA 
o In{oT71U1tion and Technologies 
The properties and realizations of the stochastic processes, the timing of 
the information and the nature of the production technologies are identical to 
the corresponding ones of the monetary economies described above. G 
Insurance Arrangements 
In the perfect insurance economies, private contracts conditional on the 
e 
realizations of the individual-specific shock can be enforced. The concavity of 
the utility function implies that the agents are risk averse. Consequently, 
before the individual-specific shock is rea1i.zed at the beginning of each period, 
G the agents trade contracts that equate the utility of workers and non-workers 
regardless of their individual marginal productivities. This c1ass of contracts 
can be trivially shown to be optimal. In the perfect insurance economies, 
therefore, agents do not value currency. The enforceability of contracts and 
o 
the exogenous nature of the lump-sum taxation reduce the agents' dynamic 
problem to a sequence of static social planner problems which 1 describe below. 
CJ States 
The state of an individual is the realization of its productivity process, s. 
The economy-wide state is the pair (x, z). The measure of agent types, X, is its 
endogenous component and· the ecoIiomy-wide productivity shock, z, is itso 
exogenous component. 
Controls 
o Each period, for each agent type s, the households trade contracts that 
determine the measure of agens who W'ork in the market, ñ(s), and the 
consumption levels for workers, cl' and for non-workers, co. 
()
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o 
Given the sequence of government expenditures, {gJ, the labor income 
tax rate poliey, 8(zt), and the agents' optimal ehoiees, the government 
determines its sequenee of lump-sum taxes, {TJ, that enables it to satisfy its 
budget. 
o 
() 
The Agents' Optimization Problem 
Given the level of lump-sum taxes, T, the measure of agent types, X, and 
the realization of the eeonomy-wide proeess, z, at the beginning of eaeh period, 
the agents trade eontraets that guarantee them the alloeations of leisure and 
eonsumption that solve the following social planner's problem: 
o 
O 
s.t. 
Lñ(s) el + 
s 
ñ(s) ~ X(s) 
1: [x(s)-ñ(s)]co 
s 
~ L ñ(s)w(s,z)[1-8(z)] 
s 
for s=l, 2, ... , ns 
for s=l, 2, ... , ns 
- T 
o 
De/inition ofEquüibrinm 
Given the initial measure of agent types xo, the labor ineome tax rate 
poliey, 8(zt), the sequenee of ,government expenditures, {gt}, and the law of 
motion for the rneasure of agent types, X' = fs(x, z, z') implied by the joint 
stoehastie proeesses, an equilibrium for this eeonorny is a household poliey, 
{eH' COt' ñ(s)} ~=O' and a government poliey, {Tt} ~=O sueh that: 
o 
i. Given 8(z), T and the realization of the eeonomy-wide proeess, z, eaeh period 
the households' poliey solves the optirnization problern deseribed aboye. 
CJ 
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o 
ii. The government budget constraint is satisfied each period, Le. 'v"t~O: 
o 
gt = 8(zt) L nt(s)w(s,Zt) + Tt 
s 
(1) 
o 
Computation 
Specializing the agents' optimization problem to the case where sE {1,2}, 
and keeping the labor income tax rates time invariant, the Kuhn-Tucker 
conditions for this problem collapse to: 
o 
(=0 ifcl > O) 
(=0 ifeo > O) 
(2) 
(3) 
o 
nl: u(Clt T - 1) - u(co, T) + Al [w(l,z)(l-8) ­
(= Oif nl > O) 
cl + co] - A2 ~ O 
(4) 
o 
n2: U(Cl, T - 1) - u(co, T) + Al [w(2,z)(l-8) - cl + co] 
(= Oif nl > O) 
- Ag ~ O 
(5) 
[ñ(l) + n(2)] Cl + [1 - n(l) ­ n(2)] Co 
[ñ(l)w(l,z) + n(2)w(2,z)] (l-8) + T 
­
~ O (6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
o 
Prescott and Townsend [1984] show that the Kuhn-Tucker conditions 
(2)-(8) are sufficient for a maximum and that the solution is unique. Further, 
the specific form of the utility function that 1 discuss below guarantees that the 
o 
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optimal consumption levels, (co, cl), are non-negative for every realization of 
the joint process (s,z). 
To compute the equilibrium 1 use the following solution algorithm 
o 
where superscript ° indicates optimal levels and the superscript * indicates 
equilibrium levels: 
i.	 As long as there are highly productive workers available, it is optimal o 
for them to be the first ones to work. 1 therefore start by supposing that 
ñO(2) = O. Then, without loss of generality, 1 let A2 = O. Substituting A2 
into (4), and solving (2), (3) and (4) at equality, 1 obtain c1' Co and Al' 
o Given	 ñO(2), c1 , Co and g, from (6) at equality and (1), 1 find ño (1) and TO. 
iL	 If ño (1,z) ~ 0, then the solution is, trivially:
 
-* -* * = -g and T* = g.
n (1) = 0, n (2) = 0, Cl* = 0, Co 
o 
iiL	 IfO < ñO(l) ~ x(1), then the solution is:
 
-* -o -* * *
 n (l) = n (1), n (2) = 0, cl =c1' ca =c8 and T* = TO. 
o 
iv.	 If ñ°(1) > x(1), then 1 let ñ*(l) = x(1) and A3 = O. Substituting A3 into (5), 
and solving (2) and (3) and (5) at equality, 1 obtain c1' Co and Al' Given 
ñ'\ 1), c1' Co and g, from (6) at equality and (1), 1 find ñO(2) and TO, 
e 
V.	 If ñO(2) ~ 0, then the solution is: 
-* - -* . 
n (1) = x(1), n (2) = ° and the (c1' co,To,Al) resulting from substituting 
these values into (1) and (6) and'solving the system formed by (1) and (2)o 
and (3) and (6) at equality. 
vi.	 If°< ñO(2) ~ x(2), then the solution is:
 
-* - -* -o * *
 n (1) = x(1), n (2) = n (2), Cl = cl' ca == Co and T* = TO.o 
VIL	 If ñO(2) > x(2), then the solution is: 
CJ 
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-oj< - -oj< -
n (1) = x(1), n (2) = x(2) and the (cl' ca, TO, 1\1) resulting from from 
substituting these values into (1) and (6) and solving the system formed 
by (1) and (2) and (3) and (6) at equality. 
Section 3. CaJibroJion 
o 
Following the general equilibrium computable business cyc1e tradition, 
1 use U.S. time series and micro data to determine the value of most of the 
e 
o 
o 
parameters of the model economies. Whenever possible, 1 choose time series 
data that are independent of the business cyc1e phenomena under 
consideration. 1 calibrate the remaining parameters so that the deviations of 
logged output from their trend are c10se to the corresponding ones for the U.S. 
economy in the 1954-85 periodo In constructing the model economy aggregates, 
1 try to replicate the methods used to obtain the corresponding U.S. economy 
series. Appendix 1 contains the definitions of the model aggregates and of the 
quarterly time series of interest. 1 discuss my parameter choices below. 
TimePeriod 
o 
e 
Most of the relevant U.S. time series consist of annually quoted quarterly 
data. A quarter of ayear seems too long a period for people to commit 
themselves to fixed holdings of small denomination assets. It therefore seemed 
reasonable to choose a shorter model periodo My choice of an eighth of ayear 
as the model period was based on two reasons: it allows for sorne temporal 
aggregation and, at the same time, it keeps the computation costs within 
reasonable limits. 
o 
o 
Preferences 
Following Kydland and Prescott (1982) and the business cyc1e tradition, 
1 choose the functional forro for U to be: 
15 
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where T-n is leisure. 
This functional form implies a unit contemporaneous elasticity of substitution 
between consumption and leisure. This fact is consistent with the U.S. 
economy observation that, secularly, per capita leisure has shown no 
o significant trend while real income has increased continuously. 1 choose 
preference parameters [3=0.995 and a=O.33. These parameter values imply an 
annual subjective time discount rate of 4 percent, and a share of leisure of 
approximately 2/3. These values for the time discount rate and for the share ofo 
leisure match with observations from national income product accounts on the 
real net return on capital, and on the average fraction of productive time that 
households al10cate to the market. A share of leisure of 2/3 implies an 
o intertemporal elasticity substitution of 2 for this variable. The available 
microeconomic evidence on the actual value of this parameter is far from 
conclusive. Hall [1980] reviews this evidence. Based on the studies of the PSID 
o	 reported by Heckman and Macurdy [1977] and Macurdy [1978], he concludes 
that 2 is a reasonable value for this parameter. Moreover it is the value 
typically used by the business cycle tradition. 
For the relative coefficient of risk aversion, (J, 1 choose a value of 1.5. 
o 
Again, this value is commonly used in applied general equilibrium exercises 
in public finance and in business cycle theory. My choice of T refiects the fact 
that, on average, when people choose to work they al10cate 45 percent of their 
o time to market activities. This corresponds to a work-week, including 
commuting time, of approximately 45 hours. Parameter T is, therefore, the 
reciprocal of 0.45, Le., T=1.22. 
o 
Transition on the Economy-wide Exogenous Process. 
The aggregate process can take two values, ze:{1,2}. State z=l represents 
good times and state z=2 represents bad times. The transition probabilities on o 
16 
o
 
the aggregate process determine the average duration of each of the shocks. 
In the U.S., business cycles last on average for about four years (see, for 
example, Delong and Summers [1977]). Consequently the average duration of 
o good and bad times is of about two years which correspond to sixteen model 
periods. The expected duration of a state is the reciprocal of 1-n(z,z) where 
rr(z,z) is the probability of state z occurring again the following periodo The 
o transition matrix for the aggregate shock that satisfies these conditions is the 
following: 
z'= 1 z'=2 
o z=1 0.9375 0.0625 
z=2 0.0625 0.9375 
o Transüion on the Indiuidual.Speci/ic Exogenous Process 
The individual-specific productivity shock can take two possible values, 
sE {1,2}. State s=1 represents periods when an agent is highly productive and 
state s=2 represents periods when an agent receives a low productivity shock. 
o This would be the case, for instance, of a qualified electrician who can only 
find a job as a janitor. The transition probabilities are chosen so that, on 
average, 92 percent of the time agents experience the high productivity shock 
o and the remaining 8 percent of the time they experience the low productivity 
shock. 1 also require the expected duration of the low productivity shock to be 
of two model periods, or a quarter of ayear. These values roughly match the 
average U.S. employment rate and the expected duration of unemployment in 
o 
U.S. business cycles. For the model economy, the transition matrix on the 
individual-specific process that satisfies these requirements, independently of 
the realization of the aggregate process, is the following: 
e 
s' = 1 s'=2 
s=1 0.9565 0.0435 
o 
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s=2 0.5000 0.5000 
o 
o 
Tec1uwlogies 
The technology parameters for the model economies are denoted w(s,z). 
1 calibrate them so that, given the transitions on the exogenous processes, the 
variations of the model aggregate output series match those of U.S. real GNP. 
For the model economies, the productivity parameters are the fol1owing: 
w(1,l) w(1,2) w(2,1) w (2,2) 
1.009 0.991 0.33297 0.32703 
o 
These choices imply a 2.34% difference between the market value of the 
agents' time in good and in bad times for both realizations of the individual­
specific process. The ratio of the marginal productivity parameters for high 
o and low productivity agents is chosen to be 3. This number is close to the ratio 
between the average hourly wage in manufacturing and the minimum hourly 
wage in the U.S... With these calibration choices 1 am assuming that there are 
o always minimum wage openings for anyone who wants them. As can .be seen 
from Table 4.1 these calibration choices result in a percentage standard 
deviation of the filtered deviations of loggecl output that is only 2 percent larger 
than the corresponding one for the U.S. economy. 
o 
Monetary and Fiscal Policy Parameters 
The government determines the labor income tax rate and the inflation 
o rate policies. 1 choose a time invariant labor income tax rate of 0.25 and an 
average inf1ation rate of 4%. These values are rough approximations to U.S. 
average tax rates and to the average percentage rate of change in the U.S. GNP 
def1ator for the period under consideration. 
o The inf1ation rate varies procyclical1y. It is 3 percent p.a. in bad times 
and 5 percent p.a. in good times. 
o 
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1 use a grid of 400 points in the asset space. This results in a currency 
unit of 0.0125 which is 0.18 percent of per capita yearly income of the calibrated 
model economy. If we take U.S. per capita income to be $20,000, this currency 
o 
unit would approximately correspond to having $36 bilIs. Asset spaces with 
finer grids	 increase the computational costs and do not result in any 
significant differences in the cyclical beha.vior of the model economies. The 
o	 maximum value of total asset holdings is 5. This number is sufficient1y large 
so that the constraint is never binding in equilibrium. 
FinalIy, government purchases of goods are equal to the net sales of the 
private sector, and government consumption equals tax receipts plus 
o 
government purchases. Government consumption leaves less goods to be 
consumed by the private sector. Therefore, in order to make both economies 
comparable, they must be subject to the same sequence of government 
o	 consumptions. In the perfect insurance economy, lump-sum taxes generate 
the seignorage revenues of the monetary economy and enable the government 
to satisfy its budget. 
o 
Section 4. The Business Cycle Behauior ofthe Ecorwmies 
o Once the monetary economy has been fulIy specified, 1 compute the 
agents' optimal decision rules folIowing the method outlined in Section 1. 1 
then simulate the model economy twenty thousand times to purge away the 
o	 initial conditions. Next, 1 compute the model economy aggregates for twenty 
one samples of two hundred and sixty eighthly observations, which 1 then 
aggregate into one hundred and thirty quarters. After each eighthly sample is 
drawn, 1 simulate the economy two hundred times to make the calculations 
o independent across samples. 
In studying the business cycle properties of the model aggregate series 1 
use Lucas [1977] definition of business cycles as Itmovements about trend in 
o 
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gross national product". For an operational definition of "trend" 1 decompose 
the aggregate series into their trend and deviation components following the 
methods first outlined in Kydland and Prescott [1982] and later discussed at 
o 
greater length in Prescott [1986] and Kydland and Prescott [1990]. 1 therefore 
log every series except those containing ratios or rates and 1 filter them using 
the Hodrick and Prescott filter with a value of 1,.=1600. Finally, in selecting 
o	 which statistics to report 1 follow the guidance of neoclassical growth theory 
and of Kydland and Prescott [1990]. 1 therefore report the size of the 
fluctuations and the sign and the size of the phase-shift of the comovement of 
the aggregate variables and real output. Hence Tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 contain 
o 
the standard deviations and the correlations of leads and lags of the relevant 
aggragate series for, respecrtively, the U.S. economy, the monetary economy 
and for the perfect insurance economy. 1 find the following: 
o 
i. The 8ize ofthe Fluctuations 
The amplitude ofthe cycles 
o As can be seen from comparing the first columns of Tables 1 and 2, the 
amplitude of the fluctuations of the monetary economy aggregates is 
surprisingly close to that of the corresponding series of the U.S. economy once 
o	 they have been judiciously chosen. This result indicates that the calibration 
exercise has been successful and can be interpreted to suggest that the 
monetary insurance mechanism is a reasonably close substitute for capital 
accumulation as a way of transferring consumption to the future. However 
o 
given that 1 abstract from capital accumulation in the model economies, the 
comparison of Tables 2 and 3 is, by far, the most meaningful. 
We can see that output fluctuations are significantly larger in the 
monetary economy than in the complete insurance economy. (17% in theo 
experiment reported). In the monetary economy agents accumulate liquid 
assets to improve their lifetime allocations of consumption and leisure while 
o 
e 
the perfect insurance arrangement allows for optimal allocations of 
consumption and leisure across agents each periodo I find that the individual 
intertemporal substitution mechanism entails larger fluctuations of the main 
e 
economic series than the collective contemporaneous one. I conducted similar 
experiments with different inflation rate policies2 and the aboye result proved 
to be robust to those changes. 
e 
Government Consumption 
I find that implementing the monetary mechanism entails large 
variations in government consumption. These variations increase 
o 
significantIy (they are 53% larger) in economies were inflation rates are kept 
time invariant when compared with those in which inflation is allowed to 
follow the cycle. These additional fluctuations in government consumption are 
o needed to absorb the productivity variations while keeping the rates of change 
of prices constant. As we have seen, the monetary economies agents vary their 
holdings of liquid assets to smooth their life-streams of consumption.. Once the 
aggregate consumption and savings decision is made, governmente 
consumption is determined residually to clear the markets. I find that the 
implementation of this mechanism entails large fluctuations in government 
consumption. In fact, I find that it is hard to reduce the size of government 
o 
consumption fluctuations under simple specifications of fiscal and monetary 
policy. 
o Hours andProducti:vity 
Accounting for the relative fluctuations of hours and productivity or real 
wages is one of the major challenges faced by any model of business cycles. In 
the U.S. economy during the 1954·85 period the ratio of the deviations in hours 
o 
as measured by the household survey to real compensation per hour in the 
business sector was 1.63. For the basic divisible labor growth structure 
described in Hansen [1985] the value of this ratio is 1.03. This number is 
o 
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clearly too	 small. When Hansen modifi.es the basic growth structure to 
include Rogerson [1988] labor indivisibilities, he obtains a value of 2.7 for this 
ratio. 
o 
Hansen assumes full sets of contingent claims and a technology that 
enables the planner to determine randomly who is to be employed each periodo 
As we have seen, the heterogeneous agent monetary construct does not include 
o	 either of these features. Unfortunately it also abstracts from capital 
accumulation. Its ratios, therefore, can only be meaningfully compared to 
those of the perfect insurance economy described in this papero I find that 
when agents self-insure against income variability by holding liquid assets the 
o 
ratio of the fluctuations in hours and real wages is 1.58. In the perfect 
insurance economy this number is 1.27. The limited monetary insurance 
abstraction, therefore, results in a move in the right direction. I have no 
o reasons to believe that this finding would be overturned if capital were to be 
included in these structures. Until someone comes up with a way to solve this 
non-trivial problem, this last statement, of course, is nothing more than an 
informed conjecture. o 
ii. The sign, size and phase-shift ofthe comovements ofthe variables and 
output 
e 
The x(t±j) column of Tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 contain the correlation 
coefficients of the cyclical deviations of each series shifted forward or 
backwards j periods and the deviations of period t real output. The largest 
o	 number in each row indicates the maximum degree of correlation and 
therefore, the phase shift of the series and the output cycle. 
Contemporoneous Correlations 
o The first striking feature of the monetary economy is the high degree of 
contemporaneous correlation of the consumption, government consumption, 
hours, wages and employrnent series. The perfect insurance economy 
o 
o
 
reproduces this property to a somewhat smal1er extent. An explanation for 
this feature is that it is only productivity variations that drive the cycle. 
o 
o 
Dampened fl;uctuations 
Secondly, abstracting from capital accumulation has important 
dampening effects in the propagation of the productivity shocks. When 
comparing the monetary and the perfect insurance economies, I find that the 
limited monetary insurance arrangement further compuounds this 
dampening effect. 
o 
o 
o 
o 
Procyclical Government 
Third, government consumption is highly procyclical and displays no 
phase shift. Several reasons justify this resulto First, it must be kept in mind 
that I abstract from government debt and, therefore, the government is foreced 
to satisfying its budget each periodo Second, labor income tax receipts are the 
main component of government income and we have already seen that the 
provision of labor services is highly procyclical. Finally, under the monetary 
insurance arrangement, agents save in good times and dissave in bad times to 
smooth their consumption. Consequently, private net sales of goods and, 
therefore, the purcahses and consumption of the government follow the cyc1e. 
o 
o 
Countercylclical prices 
In their 1990 paper, Kydland and Prescott document the common belief 
on the procyclical behavior of the price 'level. They next argue that, in the U.S., 
this was indeed the case in the period between the wars. Final1y they show 
that, since the Korean war, in the U.S. the behavior of the price level, whether 
measuered by the GNP deflator or by the consumer price index has been 
clearly countercylical and that prices lead the opposite phase oí the GNP cyc1e 
by approximately two quarters. A remarkable and unexpected feature of the 
o 
o
 
heterogeneous agent monetary construct is that it reproduces exactIy this 
same property. 
o 
Section 5. Welfare Comparisons 
o	 In this section 1 study the welfare properties of the consumption 
smoothing monetary arrangement. When compared with their colleagues of 
economies where contracts conditional on the realizations of the individual­
specific shock can be enforced, the agents of the monetary economies incur 
o 
into two types of welfare losses: those that arise from the presence of 
uninsurable risks that make the allocation of consumption and leisure across 
agents each period suboptimal, and those that arise from the inf1ation tax that 
o makes the intertemporal substitution of consumption costIy. 
Computatipnal considerations lead me to choose the following method to 
carry out the welfare comparisons: Average utility in the perfect insurance 
o	 economy is a function of the level of lump-sum taxes, Tt , of the labor income 
tax rate, 8t , of the marginal distribution of agent types Xt(s), and of the 
realization of the economy-wide shock, Zt. Throughout these welfare 
comparison experiments 1 keep 8t time invariant and equal to 0.25. The 
o 
sequence of economy-wide shocks, {zJ, is identical in both structures, and the 
distribution of agent types in the perfect insurance economy is the marginal 
distribution of agent types of the monetary economy as indexed by the 
o	 realizations of the individual-specific shock Le., 
Xt(s) = Lxia,s), 
aEA 
o	 where set A denotes the asset space. Given {8, Zt, xJ, average utility in the 
perfect insurance economy only depends on the level of lump-taxes, T. Higher 
levels of T imply lower levels of average utility. To calculate the welfare 
o 
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differences between both economies 1 use standard independent sampling 
theory to construct 99 percent confidence intervals for the average additional 
amount of lump-taxes, E, that is needed to make agents indifferent between 
o both economies. 
The method 1 use to find this interval is the following: 1 choose a value 
for E>O. 1 then draw 21 samples of 260 observations for the monetary economy. 
o	 For each sample point, 1 obtain the xt(a,s), the equilibrium level of government 
consumption, gt' and the average utility fol' the monetary economy, uf. 1 then 
use Xt (.,s), gt and Zt to compute the average utility of the perfect insurance 
economy, urCe). For each sample 1 compute the sample average difference in 
utilities, dS , where 
o 
and N is the size of the sample. 
After each sample is drawn, 1 simulate the monetary economy five 
hundred times to make the calculations independent across samples and 1 
o then draw another sample. When the 21 samples are drawn, 1 compute the 
estimates of the first and second moments of the sampling distribution: 
s 
- 1~:J" 
o	 d(E) = S '- aSeE) 
s=1 
and 
o 
where S is the number of samples. 
A 99 percent confidence interval of (I(E) is, then, d(E) ± 2S<ÍE). 1 repeat
o 
this procedure for different values of E. 1 stop when 1 obtain two intervals that 
are entirely at either side of zero but as close to zero as seems computationally 
reasonable. The 99 percent confidence interval for the average lump-sum taxo 
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o 
o 
o 
that makes agents indifferent between both economies is determined by the 
segment whose end points are the intersections with the E-axis of the lines 
determined by the end points of both intervals (see Figure 1). In Table 7.1 I 
report the results obtained for the seven experiments discussed in Footnote 2. 
It should be noted that, even though the average levels of government 
consumption are very similar for every economy, the sequences of government 
expenditures differ across experiments. 
I find the following: 
o 
o 
i. Average welfare losses range from 6.50 percent of the perfect insurance 
economy's output when inflation is infinite and, consequently there is no 
possible self-insurance to 1.25 percent when there is a time invariant, zero 
inflation rate and, therefore, intertemporal substitution of consumption is 
costless. This result suggests that the monetary insurance arrangement is a 
good substitute of the perfect insurance arrangement when inf1ation is low. 
o 
iL The monetary economy and the perfect insurance economy are closer in 
welfare terms when there are no variations in the rate of change of prices. 
o iiL The cost of a constant 10 percent inflation for the parameter values 
chosen is of 1.58 percent of the perfect insurance economy output in economies 
with time invariant inf1ation rates. 
o 
() 
IV. Average welfare losses resulting from variable inflation are of 0.16 
percent of the perfect insurance economies' output and they decrease with 
increasing rates of inflation. 
o 
o
 
Section 6. Concluding Remarks 
e 
o 
o 
o 
o 
In this paper 1 study the business cyc1e implications of alternative 
insurance technologies using a computable general equilibrium hetero­
geneous agent environment. 1 find that the limited monetary arrangement 
entails larger fluctuations in hours relative to productivity than those that 
obtain in an identical economy where every risk is costlessly insurable. 1 also 
find that in the monetary economy the price level displays a markedly 
countercyc1ical behavior. When 1 evaluate the welfare costs of the monetary 
arrangement, 1 find that they range from 6.5% of the perfect insurance 
economy's output for economies with an infinite rate of inflation to 1.25% for 
economies with a zero time invariant inflation rateo Natural extensions of this 
line of research ere the development of computational methods that will allow 
for the inc1usion of capital accumulation in these structures while keeping 
computational costs manageable and further explorations into the monetary 
properties of this type of constructs. 
* * * * * 
o 
o 
o 
o 
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Footrwtes 
1. If the government is constrained to determining the inf1ation and the labor 
o income tax rates so that they are a function of exc1usively the exogenous 
component of the economy-wide state, then the individual agents' 
maximization problem is wel1 defined when e(z) and 8(z) are given and the 
o process on z is known. In this case: 
rr(z,z') => d(a,s,z) => f(x,z) 
where d(a,s,z) denotes the agents' optimal decision rules. This problem iso 
computational1y solvable. 
On the other hand, if the int1ation rates or if the labor income tax rates 
depend on both the endogenous and the exogenous components of the economy­
o 
wide state, Le. if e=e(x,z) or if 8=8(x,z), in order to have a wel1 defined problem 
the agent must know both the process on z and the transition on f. Now 
rr(z,z') and f(x,z) => d(a,s,z) => f(x,z) 
o 
Computational1y, this problem is much harder to solve. 
2. In Experiments 2 and 3 1 study economies with average int1ation rates of ° 
and 10% which vary procyclical1y ±1% about their average. In Experiments 4, 
5, and 6, int1ation rates were. kept tim.e invariant at 0, 4 and 10%. Final1y in 
o 
Experiment 7 there is an infinite rate of int1ation. The monetary insurance 
mechanism is therefore completely shut down and the agents' optimal 
response is, trivial1y, to work and to consume the proceeds of their labor each 
periodo Tables with the results of those experiments are available upon request
o 
from the author. 
o 
o
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Appendix: De/initions afthe Model Aggregates 
and afthe Quarterly Time Series Variables 
o 
Given the agents' decision rules, the processes on the exogenous 
stochastic components of the individual and economy-wide states and an 
initial distribution of agent types, 1 generated realizations of the monetary 
e economy's equilibrium processes using the supercomputer. 
computed the following model aggregates: 
o 
1. Aggregate Real Gross Income 
y= L w(s,z)n(a,s,z)x(a,s) 
a,s 
o 
2. Post-Trade Aggregate Real Currency Holdings 
m = L a'(a,s,z)x(a,s) 
a,s 
o 
3. Aggregate Real Consumption 
e = m-:1 +y(1-8) - m
e(z) 
o 
4. Aggregate Price Level 
p = e(z)p-l 
(J 
5. Inflation Rate 
~ = e(z) - 1 p 
o 
6. Aggregate Employment1 
n = L n(a,s,z)x(a,s) 
a,s 
o 1 Since the measure oí agents is one, levels and rates are equal. 
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For each period, 1 
o 
o 
1 then used these model aggregates to construct quarterly time series 
for a number of the basic macroeconomic variables. In so doing, 1 followed as 
closely as possible the procedures actually used for U.S. data. Flows are 
therefore quoted annually. Subscript i denotes the i-th subperiod of each 
quarter. Since the model period was chosen to be one-eighth of ayear, i = 1, 2. 1 
computed the following variables: 
o 
1. Real Output 
y=4(Yl +Y2) 
o 2. Real Consumption 
e = 4(cl + c2) 
o 
3. Real Government Expenditures 
g=y-c 
o 
4. Aggregate Labor Input 
h = 4(nl + n2)0.45 
o 
5. Real Wage (= productivity) 
w=ylh 
6 Quarterly Average Employment Rate 
n = (nI + n2)/2 
o 
7. Quarterly Average Nominal Currency Holdings 
M = (m¡Pl + m2P2)/2 
o 
8. Velocity 
v=YIM 
9. Quarterly Average Price Level 
o 
P =(PI + P2)/2 
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Table 4.1: 100 U.S. Eoooomy· 
(deviations Irom trend) 
variable x 
GNP 
ronsumption1 
gov. consumpoon2 
hours3 
wages4 
. emp. rate 
Volatility 
(% Std. Dev) 
1.001 
0.879 
3.639 
1.561 
O.~ 
1.m; 
x(t-4) 
0.135 
0.387 
-o,(~1 
0.014 
0.444 
-0.045 
x(t-3) 
0.368 
0.5!D 
-o.Qlli 
0.212 
0.483 
0.147 
~ 
x(t-2) 
0.628 
O.Wl 
-0.112 
0.440 
0.fn2 
0.364 
ij 
Cross Correlation of Real 
x(t-1 ) x(t) 
0.852 I 1.(lX) 
0.783 I 0.774 
-0.122 -o.D49 
0.688 O.aii 
0.472 0.393 
0.612 0.823 
GNP With 
x(t+1) 
0.ffi1 
0.635 
0.00> 
0.875 
0.267 
0.887 
1) 
x(t+2) 
0.628 
0.446 
0.029 
0.764 
0.143 
0.821 
x(t+3) 
0.368 
0.233 
0.ffi9 
0.5!l) 
-0.009 
0.668 
ij 
x(t+4 ) 
0.134 
.{),(X)4 
0.140 
0.374 
-0.164 
0.472 
1) 
~ 
. velocity6 
, Price Level5 
1.513 
1.845 
0.979 
~ 
0.007 
-o.5ro 
-0.638 
11 
0.683 
-0.487 
-0.712 
~ 
11 
0.703 
-0.294 
-o.la) 
I} 
í 
~ 
0.625 
-o,(~1 
-o.6ffi 
0.492 
0.246 
-0.561 
0275 
0.342 
-0.429 
0.044 
0.401 
-0.291 
-0.175 
0.432 
-0.134 
-0.363 
0.447 
0.023 
• Source: Citibank Economic Database. Sample Period: 1954:1 - 1985:2 
1Nondurables and Services 
2 Federal Government Purchases 
3Household Survey 
4 Real Compensabon per Hour (Business Sector) 
5 GNP Deflator 
6Nominal GNP/M2 
o o ü,O o o o o o o 
Table 4.2: The Monetary Economy 
(deviations /rom trendj 
Volatility Cross Correlation of Real GNP With 
variable x (% Std. Dev) x(t-4) x(t-3) x(t-2) x(t-l ) x(t) x(t+l) x(t+2) x(t+3) x(t+4) 
output 1.839 
(0.002) 
-o.cm 
(0.062) 
-0.071 
(0.092) 
0.079 
(0.082) 
0.239 
(0.088) 
Hxx) 
(0.000) 
0.244 
(0.089) 
0.078 
(0.078) 
-0.064 
(0.086) 
-0.027 
(0.061 ) 
consumption 1.044 
(0.001 ) 
-0.003 
(0.084) 
-0.084 
(0.102) 
O.CIil 
(0.097) 
0.339 
(0.083) 
0.874 
(0.017) 
0.518 
(0.073) 
0271 
(0.078) 
0.087 
(0.094) 
-o.mi 
(0.069) 
gov. consumption 4.688 
(O.OOS) 
-0.004 
(0.OS3) 
-0.053 
(0.084) 
0.000 
(0.074) 
0.144 
(0.087) 
0.$2 
(0.006) 
0.044 
(0.086) 
-o.ai5 
(0.073) 
-0.151 
(0.076) 
-0.035 
(0.06S) 
hoUIS 1.283 
(0.002) 
O.cxrL 
(O.OSl ) 
-o.(H) 
(0.082) 
0.079 
(0.074) 
0.1a> 
(0.08S) 
0.92) 
(0.010) 
-0.011 
(0.083) 
-0.091 
(0.072) 
-0.173 
(0.07S) 
-0.038 
(0.067) 
wages 0.812 
(0.001) 
-0.072 
(0.097) 
-0.083 
(0.104) 
0.<E2 
(0.099) 
0.351 
(0.079) 
0.001 
(0.02S) 
0571 
(0.068) 
0.319 
(0.07S) 
0.127 
(0.092) 
-0.001 
(0.070) 
emp. rate 1.113 
(0.001) 
O.cxrL 
(O.OSO) 
-o.Cfi5 
(0.082) 
O.cm 
(0.084) 
0.1a> 
(0.08S) 
0.92) 
(0.010) 
-0.014 
(0.083) 
-0.092 
(0.071) 
-0.174 
(0.07S) 
-0.039 
(0.067) 
~ 2278 (0.002) 
-0.154 
(0.08S) 
-0.161 
(0.093) 
-o.CE9 
(0.08S) 
0.100 
(0.078) 
0.746 
(0.02S) 
0.631 
(0.061) 
0.416 
(0.074) 
O.all 
(0.103) 
O.CRi 
(0.084) 
velocity 
Price Level 
1.294 
(0.001 ) 
0.400 
(0.001 ) 
O.~ 
(0.092) 
-0.365 
(0.080) 
0.032 
(0.093) 
-0.400 
(0.06S) 
0.063 -0.108 
(0.09S) (0.08S) 
00 -0.310 (O.OSS) (O.OSO) 
O.cm 
(0.080) 
-0.064 
(0.034) 
00(0.043) 
0.177 
(0.034) 
-0.515 
(0.070) 
0.311 
(0.041 ) 
-0.314 
(0.077) 
0.369 
(0.OS4) 
-0.008 
(0.097) 
0.371 
(0.068) 
NOTE: The numbers In parentheses are sample standard devíations of the corresponding statistics 
o o o o o o o o o o
 
Table 4.3: The Perfect Insurance Economy 
(deviations Irom lrend) 
Volatility Cross Correlation of Real GNP With 
variable x (% Std. Dev) x(t-4) x(t-3) x(t-2) x(t-1 ) x(t), , x(t+1) x(t+2) x(t+3) x(t+4) 
output 1.573 
(0.002) 
-o.Da) 
(0.063) 
--0.053 
(0.095) 
0.084 
(0.088) 
0281 
(0.088) 
HXXl 
(0.000) 
0.285 
(0.088) 
0.083 
(0.082) 
-0.046 
(0.088) 
-0.014 
(0.061 ) 
consumption 0.864 
(0.001) ; 
-o.ffi8 
(0.094) 
-o.ffi2 
(0.098) 
0.004 
(0.109) 
0.353 
(0.079) 
0.717 
(0.034) 
0.646 
(0.048) 
0.356 
(0.072) 
0.152 
(0.097) 
O.oa> 
(0.072) 
gov.oonsumption 4.688 
(0.005) 
0.007 
(0.050) 
-0.041 
(0.086) 
0.104 
(0.077) 
0.179 
(0.089) 
0.932 
(0.007) 
0.034 
(0.085) 
-0.082 
(0.074) 
-0.141 
(0.074) 
-0.031 
(0.070) 
hours loa> 0.019 -0.028 O.cm 0.000 0.889 -0.009 -0.118 -0.162 -0.011 
(0.001 ) (0.054) (0.078) (0.077) (0.087) (0.012) (0.087) (0.077) (0.078) (0.070) 
wages 0.009 
(0.001) 
-0.063 
(0.088) 
-0.008 
(0.109) 
0.087 
(0.101) 
0,425 
(0.076) 
0.814 
(0.024) 
0.567 
(0.067) 
0.3)9 
(0.080) 
0.115 
(0.091 ) 
-0.015 
(0.068) 
emp. rate 0.005 
(0.001 ) 
0.018 
(0.053) 
-0.028 
(0.078) 
O.cm 
(0.078) 
0.000 
(0.087) 
0.889 
(0.012) 
-0.010 
(0.087) 
-0.118 
(0.076) 
-0.162 
(0.078) 
-0.011 
(0.070) 
NOTE: The numbers in parentheses are sample standard deviations of the corresponding statistics 
o 
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99% confidence interval for the transfer T(f;) that makes agents indifferent between 
the monetary economy and the ertect insurance economy 
o 
Table 7. 1: Welfare Comparisons* 
o Average P/p 
0.0% 
4.0% 
O 
10.00/0 
00 
Constant P/p 
1.25% ± 0.19%2 
2.18% ± 0.140/0 
2.83% ± 0.05% 
6.50% ± 0.04% 
Procyclical P/p1 
1.55% ± 0.07%2 
2.30% ± 0.08% 
2.91 % ± 0.02% 
(Percentage of the perfeet insurance economy output that makes agents indifferent between the perfeet insurance 
economy and the monetary economy)o 
'Note that the sequences of government consumptions differ across experiments 
1 Root mean squared percentage deviation of inflation =0.7 
2 99% confidence interval o 
